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I am a third year PhD student in the Economics Department at Stanford University.I study Micro Theory with focus on Social Learning, Strategic Communication and Information Design. 


Persuasion with Coarse Communication (w/ Eray Turkel)[Under Revision]


Persuasion is an exceedingly difficult task. A leading cause of this difficulty is the misalignment of preferences, which is studied extensively by the literature on persuasion games. However, the difficulty of communication also has a first order effect on the outcomes and welfare of agents. Motivated by this observation, we study a model of Bayesian Persuasion in which the communication between the sender and the receiver is constrained. This is done by allowing the cardinality of the signal space to be less than the cardinality of the action space and the state space which limits the number of action recommendations that the sender can make. Existence of a maximum to the sender’s problem is proven and its properties are characterized. This generalizes the standard Bayesian Persuasion framework, in which existence results rely on the assumption of rich signal spaces. The sender’s willingness to pay for an additional signal is analyzed as a function of the prior belief and interpreted as the value of precise communication. We provide an upper bound for this value which applies to all finite persuasion games. While increased precision is always better for the sender, it is shown that a receiver might prefer coarse communication. This is done by analyzing a game of advice seeking, where the receiver has the ability to choose the size of the signal space. In this setting, the receiver might prefer smaller signal spaces and ask for ‘simple advice’ consisting of fewer action recommendations, whereas the sender uniformly prefers larger signal spaces.


Homophily in Information Networks (w/ Matthew O. Jackson)


Other peoples’ experiences serve as primary sources of information about the potential payoffs to various available opportunities. Homophily in social networks affects both the quality and diversity of information to which people have access. On the one hand, homophily provides higher quality information since observing the experiences of another person is more informative as that person is more similar to the decision maker. On the other hand, homophily can lower the variety of potential actions about which people have information, if people similar to themselves are herding on subsets of actions. We examine the efficiency of people’s decisions as a function of the size of their network, the homophily in that network, and the accuracy of information that they obtain from different people. We identify different circumstances under which homophily helps or harms the efficiency of decision making, and leads to have group herding on actions. 


Social network factors in university student well-being and resilience during a large-scale stressor (w/ Andrea Courtney, Dean Baltiansky, Wicia Fang, Mahnaz Roshanaei,Natalie Samuels,Everett Wetchler,Zhengxuan Wu,Matthew Jackson,Jamil Zaki)  [Under Revision]


The transition to college is a challenging time during which many students suffer declines in well-being. Social connections play a key role in supporting mental health, but only tell part of the story of social life on campus. For instance, the personalities of one’s friends and neighbors on campus contribute to a “social microclimate.” Here, we quantify the collective impact of individual, social network, and community factors in the well-being of a first-year college cohort during (i) their first academic term and (ii) a stressor (the COVID-19 pandemic). Students who maintained supportive connections and belonged to emotionally stable and tight-knit microclimates reported greater well-being in their first academic term, and less anxiety when exposed to stress during the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the importance of both personal relationships and community factors in supporting mental health.

work in progress

  • A Bandit Model of Billateral Trade with Two-sided Learning (w/ Mitchell Watt)

  • Communication Design and Rating Schemes